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Abstract 
 
 Over the past 30-40 years, consumer debt has grown substantially faster than income in the United States. 
As a result, consumption has grown fast relative to national income. The economic growth that we have experienced 
in the US economy has shown to be unreliable as demonstrated by the Great Recession in 2007-2008. By creating 
unstable growth, consumer behavior could be an explanation behind the recession as well as the cause of future 
economic downturns. This paper implements a new theory of consumption practices and tests for the stability of 
economic growth and sustainability of consumer debt by using a neo-Kaleckian growth model. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 When the Great Recession affected the global economy in 2008, many people wondered 
what were some of the underlying economic causes of such a crisis. In the US specifically, the 
housing bubble was one of the major explicit dilemmas that drew attention. While the outward 
economic issues were obvious, it has become prudent to investigate what some of the possible 
underlying issues were that caused the Great Recession. 
 One theory is that the sudden reduction in economic growth was the end result of 
increased consumer spending. While Keynesian economists argue that increasing consumption 
actually boosts demand-led growth, there have been innovations to consumption practicies over 
the past few decades that could have potentially proved hazardous. In the US specifically, 
consumption has increased at a much faster pace than disposable income over the past half-
century or so, while domestic savings have remained relatively constant. One possible 
explanation for this is a drastic increase in consumption via credit. Thus it is clear that 
households are consuming outside of their means. 
 This explanation is related to the aforementioned housing bubble: families were 
purchasing goods that they could not necessarily afford because there were innovations with 
regards to mortgaging that allowed them to do so. Similarly, expansion of credit card use has 
also been a factor that has allowed for consumers to increase spending at a faster rate than their 
increase in income. 
 We have built a neo-Kaleckian model of growth that inherently contains a model of 
consumption that was proposed by Setterfield, Mei, and Kim (Forthcoming A). We have 
identified aspects of the growth in debt in order to identify if the concurrent economic growth is 
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stable. If we can identify it to be unstable it could prove to be detrimental to the economy. If we 
identify unsustainable debt, it would be in the best interest of consumers to adopt new debt 
accumulation and servicing habits. 
 While we have discovered that the consumption model we use does not provide unstable 
growth and/or unsustainable debt, it is important to note that the results Setterfield and Kim 
(Forthcoming B) find are the opposite, as they use a slightly different model for consumption and 
debt servicing. This would suggest that further research is necessary and recommended with 
regards to identifying a possible threshold for the proportion of households that service their 
debts in the way proposed in this thesis, versus the proportion that service their debts in the 
manner described by Setterfield and Kim. This threshold could be used to describe the maximum 
proportion of households that service their debt the way Setterfield and Kim suggest in order for 
the growth to remain stable and the debt sustainable. 
 This thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 is a literature review that 
addresses issues of income inequality and household debt. Chapter 3 is the construction of the 
growth and consumption models that we use. Chapter 4 is an analysis of the debt dynamics of the 
model through a numerical analysis. Chapter 5 is the conclusion. All necessary appendices 
follow the conclusion. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 The Increase in Income Inequality 
 
 There has been a long-standing debate on the significance of the distribution of income in 
the economy. Many mainstream economists have often argued that redistribution towards profits 
tends to stimulate saving, and hence investment and hence growth. However, Wisman (2009), 
among others, argues that while the distribution of income has become more unequal since the 
1970s, we have seen a decrease in aggregate savings. 
The Proposed Benefits of Increased Income Inequality 
 
 The majority of thinkers argue that income inequality is not only important, but essential 
in order to help a society prosper. Adam Smith, widely considered the father of modern 
economics, is an important reason behind why this thinking exists. Smith developed a classical 
based economy, which argued for Laissez-faire tactics. This passive approach to economics 
convinced many thinkers that the best way for the economy to run was with as little assistance as 
possible, and this includes adjusting the distribution of income (Smith 2011 p. 11). 
 One of the oldest justifications for inequality is the trickle down thesis. This is the idea 
that savings is automatically equal to investment, which means that if income is redistributed 
away from profits, it is less likely to be saved and hence invested. This supports the notion that 
the economy will not grow as fast with a redistribution of income away from profits. We will 
later argue that savings and investment being equal is not a given, but a necessary condition in 
order to achieve equilibrium. 
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 As time has gone on, various other theories and explanations have been formed to explain 
the necessity of income inequality. One of these is the idea that people have a right to keep what 
they have earned. For example, someone who has earned $3 million in a given year feels that 
they should not have to give some of that to someone who has earned $3,000. The former feels 
that he has earned his income through hard work, and that by right it is theirs. 
 Many economists and others have argued over time that income inequality is essential for 
a prospering economy, as it promotes competition. Throughout time, the mainstream view has 
been that income inequality is essential in order for an economy to succeed (Smith 2011). 
However, the combination of an increase in inequality with increased consumption can no doubt 
be harmful to the economy. 
The Proposed Downsides of Increased Income Inequality 
 
 Wisman points out the since the 1970s, we have seen the poorest 20% of Americans’ 
incomes decrease from 5.5% of national income to a mere 4% (p 104, 2009). The same decline 
in the share of income is shown for the middle 40%, while, in contrast, the most affluent 5% of 
the nation has seen their income rise from 15.5% to 21.1% of GDP. In addition, he notes that the 
saving rate for the US has decreased from just over 10% in the early 1980s, to less than 0% (-
1.0%) in 2006 (p 90). These results lead to a rejection of the notion that greater disparities in 
income distribution leads to greater savings/investment. 
 As Wisman later points out, “wage stagnation and greater inequality created consumption 
externalities, requiring households to find ways both to meet family needs and to maintain their 
relative status” (2013, 922). While income inequality has become severe, a growth in wealth 
inequality is also apparent. Wisman indicates this evidence by noting that mean wealth has 
grown twice as fast as median wealth in the economy (2013, 923). A growth in wealth and 
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income inequality throughout the economy would theoretically suppress consumption in the 
economy. Based on Keynes’ theory that consumption increases with income at a decreasing rate, 
we would expect that as the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, net consumption will fall, 
namely that the propensity to consume decreases as income increases. This is contrary to the 
evidence, which we will further investigate later as well. 
 There are certainly reasons behind the fact that the growth in inequality has been 
overlooked as a problematic area of the economy. As Palley (2002) points out, the growth in 
public as well as private debt has caused robust, demand-led growth, which has overshadowed 
the problems with distribution. In addition, he points out the growth in debt in the household 
sector, and how financial innovations have allowed for consumption to increase for those 
households whose relative incomes have decreased. 
 As I have noted, the growth in income distribution is potentially problematic for the 
economy. However, it is one of the many rungs on the ladder of the economy that I will outline. 
We will in turn see how this growth in inequality has helped lead to an increase in household 
debt accumulation and consumption. We will then see how these two factors simultaneously 
affect economic growth. 
2.2 The Increase in Demand for Credit 
 
Changes In Consumption Behavior 
 
 Consumption has always played a prominent role in the macroeconomy. Consumers as a 
whole are an important component in both the determination of national income, and in 
economic growth. Prior to the 1970s, consumption accounted for anywhere between 84% and 
88% of an individual’s personal disposable income (see Figure 2 below). While this ratio 
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increased steadily, in the 1970s there was an outburst of consumption relative to income. Over 
the past 40 years or so, namely from 1970-2012 the share of consumption out of personal 
disposable income has increased from just over 84% to well over 90%, again shown in Figure 2 
(Data supporting this information is included in Appendix A). That increase represents an 
average annual increase of 1.8% per year. In contrast, the prior 23 years represents an annual 
increase of only 0.29%. 
Figure 2: Personal Consumption Expenditure as a Ratio to Disposable Income 
  
Data Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2; A067RX1A020NBEA, PCEC 
 
 Figure 1, shown above, showcases this information. Prior to 1970, households were 
decreasing their propensity to consume, although not by much. However, from the mid 1970s on, 
we see that the propensity to consume is increasing, as consumers are spending more and more 
relative to the increase in their income. 
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 In addition, consumption now makes up a significantly larger portion of our national 
income then it once did. From the late 1940s to around the mid 1970s, consumption as a 
percentage of GDP hovered around 60%. However, since that time, we can clearly see that 
consumption has taken up a greater portion of our national income, as it now accounts for nearly 
70% of GDP. Figure 3 below shows this increase in consumption as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Figure 3: Personal Consumption Expenditures as a Ratio to GDP 
  
Data Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPCA/downloaddata?cid=106 
 
 Most theorists would assume that accompanying such a drastic increase in consumption 
relative to disposable income would be a drastic reduction in savings. However, the data suggests 
otherwise. While we have seen a reduction in savings out of income, the reduction has been very 
slight, as shown in figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4: Personal Saving as a Percentage of Disposable Income 
  
Data Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/A072RC1Q156SBEA/downloaddata?cid=110 
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relative to income is the more widespread implementation of consumer credit, and debt financed 
consumption. It is logical to conclude that the remainder of income not being saved or consumed 
is being used to service the debts that have been accumulated by households. There have been 
many innovations over the past 40 years or so, which have allowed for a robust increase in 
household debt. These will be outlined in a later section. It is important to note why this 
increased demand for credit has taken place. This can be largely attributed to changes in the 
social nature of consumption. 
Social Nature of Consumption 
 
 Preferences for consumption have evolved over time. The evidence that consumers are 
spending more out of income points to this fact in convincing fashion. Despite the growth in the 
inequality of the distribution of income discussed above, we have seen lower income households 
attempting to maintain a level of consumption comparable to that of their more affluent 
counterparts. One of the difficulties in social sciences is identifying the underlying reasons 
behind changes in behavior. In economics, this issue is no different. There are many reasons for 
a possible change in consumption preferences, and an increase in the propensity to consume. I 
will address these reasons below. 
 Sociologists and economists alike have discussed the social nature of consumption. The 
concept of ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ is one that factors into this theory. Robert Frank 
discussed the implications of this topic in his book Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior 
and the Quest for Status. An example Frank outlines to illustrate this point has to do with 
children drinking juice. He talks about how pouring a glass of juice for two children yields no 
complaints, but if you pour a taller glass for one of the children, the one with less will complain 
about not receiving an equal amount. The same is true for consumers. If we give two people 
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$100, neither one is likely to complain, assuming there are no externalities in effect. But if we 
give one of these consumers $150, and the other one gets $200, the one who received less will 
not be happy, regardless of the fact that he still has more than he originally would have. 
 This problem is heavily prevalent in the United States because of the wide disparity in 
disposable income. Although the lowest class of consumers still has more than many people in 
third world countries, they see more affluent citizens with higher income and attempt to mimic 
the behavior of these families. 
The Relative Income Hypothesis 
 
 The relative income hypothesis refers to the idea that a person’s consumption and saving 
behavior is not just a function of his or her current income, but rather of his income relative to 
what it once was, what it is expected to be in the future, and what others around him are earning. 
Outlined by James Duesenberry in his book Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer 
Behavior in 1949, the relative income hypothesis argues that consumption choices are made 
based on conscious decisions by consumers based on their observations of other households. 
Duesenberry writes: 
 For any particular family, the frequency of contact with superior goods will increase 
primarily as the consumption expenditures of others increase. When that occurs, impulses 
to increase expenditure will increase in frequency, and strength and resistance to them 
will be inadequate (p. 27). 
 Duesenberry continues this argument with a discussion of the social significance of 
consumption. He says that a goal of society is to improve our standard of living, and one way of 
achieving this is by consuming nicer goods. As a result, when one person obtains a nicer good, it 
becomes embedded in societies mind that they should consume the same higher quality product. 
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He uses this as an explanation behind why we often see consumption increase in households 
faster relative to income. Robert Frank took this idea and ran with it with his discussion of 
reference groups. 
Reference Groups 
 
 Frank discusses the concept of reference groups in Choosing the Right Pond. These 
reference groups refer to groups that individuals are able to compare themselves to in 
sociological settings. He writes: 
Sociophysiological experiments have demonstrated, for example, that specific 
measures of autonomic nervous system arousal are strongly influenced by status 
in social interactions (p. 23) 
The point Frank is attempting to convey is that it is human nature for people to compare 
themselves to those surrounding them. The phrase ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ is directly 
relevant to this topic. Many people base their decisions on those of the people close to them. If 
one person gets a new car, their neighbor is often likely to make a similar expenditure just to be 
viewed in a comparable light, financially. 
 Frank is not the only person to make note of these reference groups. Cynamon and 
Fazzari (2008) discuss these groups in detail and make the connection to economics by referring 
to positional externalities. The point that they make is that if you observe two families of similar 
income, one that is secluded and one that exists in a neighborhood with other high-end 
consumers, the secluded family is likely to spend less of their income because they do not have 
the reference groups to base their decisions off of. Below are two examples of how externalities 
can affect a consumer’s reference groups. 
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i. Mass Media Effect 
 As Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) point out, consumers are influenced by the role that the 
media plays in influencing consumers. Most advertising and marketing campaigns are designed 
to target those with enough disposable income to purchase the product. For example, imagine a 
commercial for the iPhone. The Apple smart phones are marketed at anywhere from $200-$600. 
This means firms are targeting consumers who have an excess of income of this amount. But 
how does the person who is unable to afford the phone react to the advertisement? 
 Most people, regardless of whether they can afford the more expensive product or not, 
feel the need to maintain a level of consumption comparable to that which the media dictates is 
necessary. It is human nature to want to feel equal, and the media is able to generate feelings of 
inferiority for those who do not own these luxury goods. Technology advances in recent history 
is a perfect example of this effect. Laptops and smartphones were at one point a luxury good, but 
they have become so heavily advertised that they are now virtually a necessity. 
ii. Two-Earner Effect 
 The two-earner effect pertains to households in which both adults have jobs. This effect 
is relevant more to the households that do not have two incomes but are in contact with families 
that do. Consider a situation where there are two neighboring families. One of these families 
consists of two parents with jobs, while the other one has a stay-at-home parent and a working 
parent. The two-earner family is likely to have a higher net income and is more likely to 
consume more. However, they factor into the reference group of the single-earner family. The 
single-earner family sees the increase in consumption of the two-earner household and is likely 
to attempt to mimic this behavior. This could potentially lead to consuming outside of their 
means. As Cynamon and Fazzari point out: 
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As the neighbors next door, the couple’s siblings, or the families of the employed 
spouse’s co-workers move toward two earners in their households, the pressure on 
the single-earner family rises, likely driving the desired consumption up faster 
than income (pp.  11-12) 
The importance of these reference groups is clearly evident in this example. If there is a single-
earner household living in a community comprised almost exclusively of other single-earner 
households, we will not see this effect. However, because the abundance of two-earner 
households has increased, this has become an increasingly more relevant factor in explaining the 
drastic increase in consumption. 
 
 One of the biggest problems with these causes of increased consumption pertains to the 
idea of consumption through habit formation. Take the two-earner effect described above. A 
household with two employed adults is more likely to consume more. However, let’s say one of 
the earners of the family loses his or her job. This would substantially decrease the income of 
said family, however, more often than not, the family would attempt to maintain certain 
consumption standards because they have grown accustomed to a certain level. This habit 
formation is fueled by some of the social aspects outlined above. People feel like they need to 
consume what is dictated to them by various media outlets or their reference groups. 
 The concept of keeping up with the Joneses has been around for over half a century. It is 
no secret that those who cannot afford as much as their more affluent neighbors struggle to 
maintain a level of consumption that causes them to appear equally successful financially. The 
materialism in our society is a driving force behind this effect. However, while we have now 
discussed some causes of why consumers feel the need to make purchases beyond their means, 
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we must now identify what financial regulations have allowed for this increased consumption to 
occur. 
Materialism and the Effect on Debt 
 
 Materialism in the United States is prevalent in day-to-day life. Name brand clothing, 
popular smart phones, and other luxury goods are becoming normal goods as time goes on. Even 
many families that have a lower household income are purchasing products that are outside of 
their price range as noted above. In a study of materialism and debt, Watson (2003) notes that 
those with high levels of materialism are more likely to spend more. Watson then points out that 
these same households are likely to have more relaxed feelings towards taking on increasing 
amounts of debt. A number of other hypotheses were tested concerning the materialistic nature 
of certain households and the likelihood of these households in taking on various types of debt: 
 People with high levels of materialism (in comparison to people with low levels of 
materialism) are more likely to exhibit behaviors consistent with positive attitudes toward 
debt – use of installment credit and outstanding debt. (Watson 735). 
In an increasingly materialistic society, Watson shows that the prospect of debt becoming a 
problem among households is not only a possibility, but a probability. 
 This notion is supported in an empirical study by Brown et. al. (2013). In this paper, the 
authors note that households are far more likely to accept the risk of debt accumulation, 
especially lower income households: 
 The risk attitudes measure is found to have a larger impact at the bottom end of the debt 
distribution, i.e. the influence of risk attitudes diminishes as the debt burden of the 
household increases (Brown et. al 299). 
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Tying these two studies together, it is clear that lower income households are more likely to 
accept risk, and thus more likely to accumulate debt. 
 It seems evident that households are in fact increasing their materialism in the United 
States. The consumption evidence outlined above supports this notion. Because of this increasing 
desire for luxury goods, households are more likely to attempt to accumulate debt. However, 
purchasing on credit is not a one-way street. While increased materialism certainly explains why 
households want (so to speak) to increase their debt, in order for this to take place, there must be 
creditors that are willing to satisfy this increase. 
2.3 The Increase in Supply of Credit 
 
Availability of Credit 
 
 In order for debt to actually be accumulated, creditors must make this debt available to 
common households. Households must be able to purchase on credit in order for debt to actually 
increase. Cynamon and Fazzari make a note in their paper about this increase in availability of 
debt: “Between 1970 and 1998, [credit] card ownership in the lowest income quintile went from 
2 percent to over 25 percent, and the highest quintile went from 33 percent to 95 percent” 
(Cynamon and Fazzari 2008 15). Not only were borrowers requesting more and more credit, but 
lenders were clearly facilitating this increase by granting more credit applications. This two-way 
relationship has allowed for household debt to increase to staggering levels, which could prove 
to be detrimental to the economy. 
 Figure 5 (shown below) shows the amount of loans that were granted on a monthly basis 
over the past half-century or so. It is clear from looking at the graph that more and more credit 
requests were being granted up until the Great Recession. This supports the notion that creditors 
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were becoming more and more lenient with their credit applications and hence contributed to the 
accumulation of household debt. 
Figure 5: Number of Loans on Bank Credit 
 
Data Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/LOANS/downloaddata?cid=33078 
 
 As a result of the increase in consumption relative to income, consumers have responded 
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of the driving factors behind this increase in debt. The real issue lies when we look at the 
relationship between aggregate household debt and national income. As shown in Figure 6, the 
debt to income ratio has increased substantially over the last 40 years. While in the 1940s, 50s 
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1999-­‐0
1-­‐03	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9-­‐03	  
2016-­‐0
2-­‐03	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problem in a later section. For now, we will investigate some of the causes of this increase in the 
willingness to supply debt. 
 The distribution of income is an important contributor to the explosion of debt relative to 
income. As noted in the previous section, many families attempt to emulate more affluent 
families in an effort to seem of a higher social class. This emulation effect often leads to families 
consuming beyond their means. Due to changes in availability of personal financing, many 
people are able to use credit and other debt accumulation techniques for financing these 
consumption expenditures. 
Changes in Household Mortgaging 
 
 Mortgage financing options also played a major role in allowing for an increased level of 
household debt. The introduction of cash-out financing allowed for households to purchase 
houses that were out of their price range, based on the assumption that housing prices would 
continue to rise and they could remortgage the house a few months down the line, before the 
payments became too steep. While again, this was partly the result of consumers attempting to 
take on a greater debt then they could afford, banks contributed to this issue as well by willingly 
supplying the necessary loans. 
 However, the problem lies in the use of these loans. Banks were allowing households to 
borrow against the equity they already owned on their houses in order to finance consumption 
goods. For example, now instead of refinancing the house for living purposes, households were 
borrowing money to finance vacations or pay for holiday gifts. This method of debt 
accumulation can clearly be attributed to lack of due diligence on the part of the creditors. 
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Increased Use of Credit Cards 
 
 The use of credit cards has also helped households to accumulate debt. By allowing 
consumers to make purchases on credit, consumers have become more comfortable accumulating 
debt for the benefit of their consumption practices. Credit card companies have been willing to 
oblige this increased demand for credit cards. As noted earlier, we have seen a drastic increase in 
the use of credit cards in recent decades. This phenomenon has occurred, not just because more 
people are applying for credit cards, but because credit card companies are, as rational firms, 
more and more willing to supply these cards. 
 If banks are allowing for more and more debt to build up, the risk of mass default was 
clearly becoming more and more likely. It was not a coincidence that so many households were 
unable to service these debts, but in reality, it was a product of the financial sector taking on the 
risk as well. 
 Figure 6 below shows the largest underlying issue that lies within this increase in debt. 
The debt:income ratio in the United States has increased to the point that it was well over 1 prior 
to the start of the Great Recession. This is one of the most important motivating statistics behind 
this thesis, and something we will analyze in greater detail later. 
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Figure 6: Outstanding Household Debt to Disposable Income Ratio 
  
Data Source: Haver Analytics 
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3 Theoretical Model 
3.1 Neo-Kaleckian Growth Model 
 
 In this thesis, we use a Neo-Kaleckian growth model as the basis for investigating growth 
and debt dynamics. Neo-Kaleckian growth economists are followers of the Post-Keynesian 
growth school. Specifically, the model is built off of Joan Robinson’s contributions to the field 
(Lavoie 1992). In Robinson’s theory there are two vital equations: the determination of the rate 
of profit and the determination of the rate of accumulation. Her rate of profit equation is 
consistent with the equilibrium assumption that investment is equal to savings, and hence can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
€ 
I = S
S = sπΠ
⇒Π =
1
sπ
I
Π
K =
1
sπ
I
K
r = 1sπ
g
 
Where r is the rate of profit, sπ is the propensity to save out of profits, and g is the actual 
accumulation rate. It is useful to note that this is essentially the same as Karl Marx’s equation for 
growth (g = sπr). The only difference is that here, the direction of causality is different, as 
Robinson argues that growth is demand led, in the typical Keynesian fashion. We can think of 
Robinson’s model being written as: 
 
€ 
gs = sπ r 
for simplicity, making gs the required accumulation behavior that is necessary under the 
conditions I = S. This same assumption and derivation holds in the neo-Kaleckian model. 
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 The second important equation that Robinson uses is the determination of the rate of 
accumulation. Robinson argues that the utilization rate is constant in the long run (for simplicity 
u = 1). Robinson’s desired accumulation is thus g = g(r), namely the expected rate of profit 
determines the amount of accumulation. Here is where Neo-Kaleckians differ in their 
determination of growth. We assume that the utilization rate of capacity is variable, making 
g*=g*(π,u), or equivalently (according to Stockhammer (1999)): 
 
€ 
gk = γ 0 +γ1r  
Note, that here, γ0 is a parameter that is used to measure the state of confidence of investors, 
while γ1 is a parameter that measures how sensitive the desired rate of accumulation is to the 
actual profit rate. 
 In order to complete the model, we must determine a representation of the rate of 
capacity, as it is variable. Traditionally, u is defined as 
 
€ 
u = KuK  
namely, the amount of capital that is being used expressed as a ratio to the amount of total 
capital. However, we will assume a fixed coefficient production function such that: 
 
€ 
Y =min{K v1 ,
Lv2}  
In this fashion, the capital:output ratio is defined as constant, and equal to v1 and the labor:output 
ratio is v2. Thus, we can think of Y/Ku as a constant as well, which leads us to create our formula 
for u, where: 
 
€ 
u = YKu
* KuK =
Y
K  
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 We can move forward and recognize that the profit rate (defined as r = ∏/K) is equal to 
the capacity utilization rate times the profit share (π = ∏/Y), so that we can express the rate of 
profit as 
 
€ 
r = πu  
which gives us a final expression for our rate of accumulation in terms of our capacity utilization 
rate: 
 
€ 
gk = γ 0 +γ1πu  
A diagram depicting this model is included in Appendix 2. 
 It is important to note that in the basic model format, a stable equilibrium exists if we 
make some underlying assumptions. The first of which, is that our intercept for gk, namely γ0, is 
positive. In addition to this, we need the slope of the gk schedule to be shallower than the slope 
of the gs schedule (sπ > γ1π). If both of these conditions hold, we have a stable equilibrium. 
 This equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the gk and gs schedule. If this is the 
case then we have: 
 
€ 
gs = gk
sπ r = γ 0 +γ1πr
r* = γ 0sπ −γ1π
⇒ g* = sπγ 0sπ −γ1π
⇒ u* = vrr *
π
 
The above values for r*, g*, and u* are the equilibrium values for our three variables. It may also 
be useful to note some comparative statics in this relationship. For u, when sπ increases, u, 
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decreases, because an increase in sπ negatively affects our rate of profit, which will decrease the 
utilization rate. Similarly, if the profit share increases, the utilization rate also decreases. 
These derivatives are spelled out below. 
 
€ 
dr *
dsπ
=
−γ 0
(sπ −γ1π )2
⇒
du*
dsπ
=
vr
π
* −γ 0(sπ −γ1π )2
< 0
du*
dπ = −
vrr *
π 2
< 0
 
3.2 Aggregate Consumption Theory 
 
 In the manner proposed by Kim et. al (forthcoming A), there are essentially two methods 
in which households consume, save, and service their debts out of their incomes. As has been 
previously indicated, houses have been borrowing at an increasing speed over the last few 
decades, so we can no longer think of consumption as being a function solely of wealth, income, 
or wages. Now that debt accumulation has become a factor, the idea of household borrowing 
must be interpreted as a facilitator of consumption. 
 The interesting issue here lies in how households service their debts. If households 
borrow without being able to repay their loans, there is a strong possibility of default on those 
loans, which, as Minsky (1978) notes, could result in financial fragility. This is exactly what 
seems to have occurred in 2008, as banks were giving out mortgages to families that were unable 
to service their debts and hence resulted in the loss of numerous houses as well as a credit 
crunch, as identified by Setterfield and Fontana (2009). It is important to note, that we use the 
term debt servicing to refer to repaying the interest on loans at a bare minimum. 
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 However, households do not merely consume and service their debts, taking up the 
entirety of their disposable income. In a Keynesian world with an uncertain future, rational 
consumers will save a proportion of their income in order to assist their family during future 
trials and tribulations. In addition, we assume that all households are homogeneous to their 
specific groups, which I will outline below. 
 The growth in the distribution of income is evidence to not just a disparity between the 
capitalists (profit earners) of the US and everyone else. We are actually able to distinguish 
between 3 groups of households: production workers, supervisor/managerial workers, and 
capitalists. For our purposes, we will assume that debt servicing is exclusively an issue with 
production workers. Capitalists often do not even take on debt, as they are primarily the ones 
providing the loans, and we assume (and reasonably so) that supervisor workers are able to 
service their debts without issue (if and when they do take on debt). Thus, we concern ourselves 
with two types of consumption households: workers and rentiers. Working households refer to 
production workers and make up about the bottom 80% of the income distribution (as noted by 
Palley 2013). Rentier households are the remaining houses, composed of managerial workers and 
capitalists. 
 In order for our model to be theoretically accurate as well as plausible, there are certain 
assumptions we will make. First, we make the assumption that the propensity to consume for 
production workers is greater than that of rentiers. In addition, we will assume that all working 
households and only these households finance part of their consumption through borrowing, 
while rentier households do not. In addition, we have made the assumption that due to 
uncertainty within the financial markets, it is only natural for working households to save in 
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accordance with their debt accumulation and consumption so as to protect themselves against 
unforeseen financial struggles. 
 Our model for consumption is as follows: 
 
€ 
C = CW +CR +D
•
  
Here, D-dot refers to the accumulation of debt. As noted in a previous section, households’ 
consumption behaviors are influenced by consumption behaviors of their reference groups. 
Specifically, more often than not, production workers attempt to mimic the consumption 
behaviors from rentier households, as these households represent a greater level of financial 
success. Thus, D-dot can be expressed in this form: 
 
€ 
D
•
= β(CT −CW )   
where CT refers to some target level of consumers wish to emulate based on the factors outlined 
above such as reference groups. In addition, we will assume that production workers naturally 
wish to target a level of consumption that is comparable to that of the rentiers, namely that: 
 
€ 
CT =ηCR   
€ 
0 <η ≤1  
Essentially, the way working households operate is in this manner: they observe the consumption 
behavior of the rentiers, they choose a target level of consumption that is based on this and is 
greater than their consumption, they accumulate debt based on bank loans, credit cards, etc. and 
they consume after the fact. 
 Kim et. al theorize that the debts that production workers accumulate will be serviced in 
one of two ways. The first concerns the type of household that is more materialistic, and thus 
consumption is of a greater priority. This type of household takes their disposable income, and 
consumes a portion of it based on their propensity to consume, cW. From whatever is left over, 
the household will choose to save a proportion of their income, or to service their debts from it. 
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Kim and Setterfield have written a paper describing the stability and sustainability affects of this 
method of debt servicing behavior in which there is a stable, equilibrium value of growth, but the 
debt:capital ratio that is consistent with equilibrium is unsustainable (Kim, forthcoming B). 
 For our purposes, we will assume the validity of a second type of consumption behavior, 
namely that production workers service their debts before deciding whether to consume or save. 
This is the more conventional approach, where households shave off a portion of their income to 
service their debts, before they practice saving and consumption behaviors. An equation 
representing the consumption of production workers can be expressed as follows: 
 
€ 
CW = cW (WPϕN − iDR )   
Here, WP is the wages of production workers, φ is the proportion of workers that are production 
workers versus supervisory workers, and N is the level of employment. This means that WPφN is 
the aggregate income of production workers in the economy. DR is equivalent to the debt 
accumulated by workers, which is equal to the loans received by workers, with the removal of 
deposits made, with i being the interest rate. 
 In addition, we can derive from this an expression for the consumption of rentiers, which, 
as a reminder are composed of supervisory workers and capitalists, who, for simplicity, we will 
assume consume equal proportions of their income: 
  
€ 
CR = cπ (WR (1−ϕ)N +Π+ iDR )   
where ∏ is total profits in the economy. Notice also that we have WR(1-φ)N equal to the 
aggregate income of managerial workers. Thus, we can build a model for aggregate consumption 
as follows, by substituting the previous equations into the consumption equation, we get the 
following. 
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€ 
C = (1− β)cW (WPϕN − iDR )
+(1+ βη)cπ (WR (1−ϕ)N +Π+ iDR )   
The derivation of this consumption model is shown in Appendix 2. 
3.3 Growth Model with Consumption Built In 
 
 We can create a temporary equilibrium such that: 
 
€ 
Y = CW + CR + ˙ D + I  
where, in the absence of an external sector and a public sector, we can think of this as the goods 
market clearing conditions. Based on our determinations for consumption out of wages, by 
rentiers, debt accumulation and investment, we can substitute in and create an expression for Y 
where: 
 
€ 
Y = (1− β)cW (WPϕN − iDR ) + (1+ βη)cπ (WR (1−ϕ)N +Π+ iDR ) + I  
 If we normalize, by K, we can obtain an expression for the utilization rate of capacity, 
where: 
  
€ 
u = (1− β)cWidR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0(1− (1− β)cWωP − (1+ βη)cπφωP − (1+ βη)cππ − γ1π )
 
This allows us to express the rate of profit and accumulation as well: 
  
€ 
r = π[(1− β)cWidR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0](1− (1− β)cWωP − (1+ βη)cπφωP − (1+ βη)cππ − γ1π )
gk = γ 0 +
γ1π[(1− β)cWidR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0]
(1− (1− β)cWωP − (1+ βη)cπφωP − (1+ βη)cππ − γ1π )
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3.4 Comparative Statics 
 
 Based on our calculations, we can create a table that shows the effects on our equilibrium 
growth rate, rate of profit and rate of utilization of changes in some of our variables. Table 1 
shows these changes: 
 Table 1: 
Variables γ0 π i dR η 
u + ? ? ? + 
r + ? ? ? + 
gk + ? ? ? + 
 
With the exception of our intercept term, which is a confidence variable that is determined by 
what Keynes referred to as the animal spirits of investors, and our η variable, which accounts for 
our emulation parameter, all of our variables have an ambiguous effect on any of our three 
equilibrium outcomes. 
 It makes sense that our partial derivatives with respect to η are unambiguously positive. If 
working households attempt to emulate a higher proportion of consumption among rentier 
households, then more debt will be accumulated, so consumption will increase as well, spurring 
economic growth. 
 The ambiguity of our partial derivatives with respect to the other three independent 
variables is useful to analyze as well. With an increase in the profit share, the directional change 
of u, r, and gk is not made clear based on my calculations and assumptions. The same holds true 
with a change in the interest rate or the debt:capital ratio. However, in the next section we will 
investigate how these variables may change when we use plausibly hypothesized parameters for 
our independent variables. 
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4 Debt Dynamics 
4.1 Calculation of dR 
 
 Finally, we will address the issue of stability of growth and sustainability of consumer 
debt. Based on how we defined dR, we can identify an expression for the rate of change of dR as 
follows: 
  
€ 
˙ d R =
β(CT −Cw ) − ˙ D w
K − gkdR
˙ d R = β(ηCR /K −Cw /K) − ˙ D w /K − gkdR
˙ d R = βηcπ (ω ru +πu + idR ) − (1+ βcw − cw )(ω pu − idR ) − gkdR
 
By substituting the previously obtained expressions for u and gk, we can identify an expression 
for ̇dR. Once we have this expression, we can identify steady state values of dR by setting d•R = 0. 
We will investigate this further in the numerical analysis. 
 Because a change in dR results in an ambiguous change in gk, we will need to analyze the 
equilibrium values further with a numerical analysis (addressed later). However, obtaining an 
expression such as the one shown above allows us to determine the equilibrium values of the 
debt:capital ratio. When the rate of change of dR is 0, we would be at equilibrium and the 
stability of this equilibrium is determined by the shape of the 
€ 
˙ d R  curve. Because our equation for 
gk is as follows: 
  
€ 
gk = γ 0 +
γ1π[(1− β)cWidR + (1+ βη)cπ idR +γ 0]
(1− (1− β)cWωP − (1+ βη)cπφωP − (1+ βη)cππ −γ1π )
 
We can see that there are two values of dR in the numerator. Thus, when we multiply gk by dR as 
shown in the expression for the rate of change of dR, we would end up with a quadratic equation. 
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It is therefore important to identify parameter values so that we can determine the concavity of 
the resulting parabola. 
 Although the concavity of our expression for 
€ 
˙ d R  is not yet determined, we can see that it 
is clearly a quadratic, as multiplying dR by gk gives us a product of two dR terms (discussed 
above). This is important because it means that, assuming there are two x-intercepts for the 
parabola, there are two equilibrium values for the rate of change of dR. One of these is the stable 
equilibrium namely, temporary disequilibrium simply results in a movement along the curve 
back towards the stable value. The other equilibrium is unstable, meaning that the same 
disequilibrium will result in further diversion from equilibrium. Thus, once we determine the 
stable and unstable equilibrium values, we can identify whether stability and sustainability is 
achieved by looking at the maximum feasible level of debt relative to the value associated with 
equilibrium. 
 We define this maximum level of debt as the largest value of the debt:capital ratio that is 
sustainable based on the theory of consumption that we have been implementing. By assuming 
that households place a first priority on servicing their debts, it is clear that 
  
€ 
iDRmax −WpN = 0  
where DRmax represents the maximum amount of debt that households could take on while still 
being able to service these debts. It follows from this that: 
  
€ 
dRmax =
ω pu
i  
If the value of dRmax lies above the stable equilibrium value, then we can determine that the debt 
is sustainable in equilibrium. 
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4.2 Numerical Analysis 
 
 In order to develop an expression for 
€ 
˙ d R  as a function of dR, we must identify plausible 
values for all of our other parameters. Information showing what these values are as well as 
where they come from is included in Table 2. It is important to note that many of these values are 
based on previous studies and real world data, while others are more arbitrary. For example, the 
value γ0, a measurement of the level of confidence, is almost purely speculative. It is important 
to note that the value of γ0 has been calibrated around the expectation that firms attempt to 
achieve a utilization rate of around 80%, given the values of all other parameters shown below. 
This was done because 80% is the average rate of capacity utilization in the US economy over 
the last several decades. 
 Table 3: Parameter Values 
 Neo-Liberal 
Parameters 
Source 
γ0 0.095 Authors’ Calculations1 
γ1 0.5 Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) 
cW 0.94 Authors’ Calculations Based on 
Bunting (1998) 
β 0.1 Authors’ Calculations2 
i 0.481 Authors’ Calculations based on 
World Bank Data3 
π 0.34 Authors’ Calculations4 
η 21.7181 Authors’ Calculations5 
cπ 0.2 Setterfield and Budd (2011) 
ωp 0.42 Authors’ Calculations based on  
Mohun (2006) 
Φ 0.567 Authors’ Calculations6 
1: Set in accordance with other parameters in order to yield a capacity utilization rate of around 
0.8 
2: Set in accordance with other parameters in order to satisfy the Keynesian stability condition 
3: See data.worldbank.org 
4: Set in accordance with π=1-(1+Φ)ωp 
5: Calculated based on η = δλ, where λ is an emulation parameter (Ravina 2007) and δ is a 
scaling parameter based on Mishel and Sabadish (2012) 
6: Calculated based on Φ = αφ 
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 The distributional parameters are based in correspondence with a Neoliberal growth 
regime. Many Keynesian economists identify the Neoliberal growth parameters as a consequence 
of income distribution: “Between 1973 and 2006, the average annual real income of the bottom 
90 percent of households fell while that of the top 1 percent increased 3.2 fold” (Kim 
Forthcoming B p. 20). This growth in the distribution of income is captured by the parameters 
from row 1 in Table 4. 
 Evaluating our 
€ 
˙ d R function with these parameter values gives us the result that gk 
decreases with an increase in dR. Evaluating and simplifying the expression gives us: 
 
€ 
˙ d R = 0.16439 − 0.234134dR + 0.016054dR 2  
A graph illustrating this equation is shown below in Figure 8. Using Mathematica, we are able to 
identify the stable and unstable equilibrium points by the x intercepts1. Our x-intercepts in the 
graph are points of interest for our purposes. As figure 8 expresses the rate of change of the 
debt:capital ratio as a function of the debt:capital ratio itself, we can see that when the graph is 
negative, the rate of change is negative which results in a leftwards movement along the x-axis. 
Similarly, if the graph is positive, we will move to the right along the x-axis as the rate of change 
is now positive. We will refer to the stable equilibrium, the left-most x-intercept, as dR1. We 
know that this is the stable steady state because if we revert a little outside of equilibrium, the 
force of the rate of change will pull us towards it. In contrast, dR2 is also an equilibrium value, 
but it is unstable. 
 For example, consider a situation where we start at a value of dR such that dR < dR1. It is 
clear that 
€ 
˙ d R > 0, so dR will have a positive rate of change, meaning as time goes on, dR will 
increase and move towards dR1. Similarly, if we start at a point dR such that dR > dR1 we can see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Table 4 provides this information as well as identifying the changes that would occur under a 
Golden Age distributional parameter set.	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that 
€ 
˙ d R < 0, so dR will have a negative rate of change, meaning as time goes on, dR will decrease 
and move towards dR1. It is because of this that we can identify dR1 as the stable equilibrium. 
However, if we start at a value of dR such that dR > dR2, than 
€ 
˙ d R > 0. This will result in a 
movement of dR further away from dR2 making it the unstable equilibrium. 
 
Figure 8: 
 
 We have already noted that dR1 is the stable equilibrium and dR2 is unstable. Now we need 
to examine the sustainability of consumer debt in equilibrium. We can do this by looking at our 
calculations for the feasibility coefficent, c: 
  
€ 
c =ω pu − idR1  
If c is positive, it means that our value for dRmax is above the stable equilibrium value, dR1, which 
means that the debt level at dR1 is sustainable. Calculations for c are also included in Table 4. We 
can see that under the plausible, Neo-Liberal conditions, not only does the stable equilibrium 
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exist (as evidenced by figure 8), but the level of debt that is concurrent with this equilibrium is 
sustainable. We can see this in two ways. One, as mentioned is identifying the value of c, and 
whether it is positive or not. The second method is by simply looking at the dR1 column of table 4 
and making sure the dRmax column is a larger value. This leads to the assertion that while there 
are certainly negative drawbacks to consumers accumulating mass amounts of debt, we can not 
assert that it would be problematic for the economy based on the assumptions we have made. 
 It is useful to identify how changing the parameters to fit a golden age regime would 
affect this result. A Golden Age regime is a term coined by Keyensian economist that captures 
the growth of income prior to the 1970s, when all income grew at roughly the same rate (~3 
percent) according to Kim (Forthcoming B). This phenomenon prevented income inequality 
from increasing substantially. Golden Age distributional parameters are captured by row 2 of 
Table 4. 
 Table 4: Change in Distribution: Golden Age and Neoliberal Regimes 
 ωr ωp π η dR1 dR2 dRmax c 
Neo-Liberal 0.24 0.42 0.34 21.72 0.7396 13.8446 7.08535 0.305 
Golden Age 0.23 0.48 0.2896 2.92 -0.1044 9.6854 3.1055 0.1544 
 
 From the above table, we can see that regardless of the parameter make up, based on the 
implemented theory of consumption and debt servicing our debt is sustainable in the steady state 
equilibrium. Under both distributional regimes, our value for c is positive which supports this 
notion. Interesting to note, however, is the fact that in Golden Age system, dR1 is negative 
(shown in figure 9). Our equation for the rate of change of the debt:capital ratio as a function of 
dR itself is shown below: 
  
€ 
˙ d R = −0.01314 − 0.1246dR + 0.13dR 2  
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The above equation gives us the stable equilibrium of dR = -0.1. This means that with a 
redistribution of income, we would see working households change from net debtors to net 
creditors. 
Figure 9: 
 
 Although both situations described above support the same result (that being that a stable 
equilibrium growth rate is obtainable and that the debt:capital ratio accompanying it is 
sustainable), the results are based on the assumption that all households service their debts in 
exactly the same way. As a result of this, the results in this thesis are different than those 
obtained in Setterfield and Kim’s paper, where the debt servicing behavior is markedly different. 
In this paper, we considered households that service their debts out of their disposable income 
and then choose whether to consume or spend whatever is left over. In the preceding paper, 
Setterfield and Kim discuss a situation where households consume first, and then delegate the 
remaining disposable income towards saving and debt servicing. 
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 In Setterfield and Kim, the resulting parabola from the rate of change equation is concave 
down, which means that the larger of the two intercepts is the stable equilibrium. It is because of 
this important difference that the results differ between the two papers. 
 Further research could prove to be worthwhile, namely an investigation into what 
proportion of those servicing their debts behave the way that Setterfield and Kim suggest, and 
what proportion behave the way I have alluded to. Furthermore, it would be interesting to find 
what threshold this proportion would need to cross in order for the results to change from 
sustainable debt, to unsustainable. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
 In this thesis, we have investigated some reasons behind the growth in consumption and 
household debt, specifically in the United States. We have taken a look at the growth in income 
inequality and how that has helped fuel the desire among households to consume, and how 
financial innovations have allowed for this consumption to be accomplished through debt 
accumulation. We then constructed a theoretical model of growth and consumption and, through 
a numerical analysis, have identified the stability of growth and sustainability of debt that results 
from our assumptions. 
 From our results, we can see that while there is not unstable growth and unsustainable 
debt, a redistribution of income would not cause a reversal effect. In fact, a redistribution that is 
proposed with the golden age parameter set would actually result in working households 
becoming net creditors instead of debtors. The model of debt servicing that we have used has 
proven to not be detrimental to the growth of an economy using a neo-Kaleckian growth model. 
However, these results are contradictory to those obtained by Setterfield and Kim (Forthcoming 
B), which suggests additional research would be both beneficial and necessary. This research 
could identify a threshold value for the proportion of households that service their debts one way 
versus the proportion that service their debts the other way. However, all that we can say for 
certain after this thesis is that identifying causes of the Great Recession is still up in the air, and 
one that economists can look forward to tackling in the future.
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Appendix 1: Data 
Personal Disposable Income, Consumption and Saving 
DATE PCE PDI PCE:PDI Saving Saving:PDI MPC+MPS 
1947-01-01 162.0 174.8 0.926773455 11.0 0.062929062 0.989702517 
1948-01-01 175.0 194.5 0.899742931 17.2 0.088431877 0.988174807 
1949-01-01 178.5 194.5 0.917737789 13.6 0.069922879 0.987660668 
1950-01-01 192.2 215.0 0.893953488 20.0 0.093023256 0.986976744 
1951-01-01 208.5 237.4 0.878264532 25.9 0.109098568 0.9873631 
1952-01-01 219.5 250.7 0.875548464 27.8 0.110889509 0.986437974 
1953-01-01 233.0 266.3 0.87495306 29.2 0.10965077 0.98460383 
1954-01-01 239.9 272.4 0.880690162 28.2 0.103524229 0.984214391 
1955-01-01 258.7 291.7 0.886870072 28.2 0.096674666 0.983544738 
1956-01-01 271.6 311.8 0.871071199 34.7 0.111289288 0.982360487 
1957-01-01 286.7 329.6 0.869842233 36.9 0.111953883 0.981796117 
1958-01-01 296.0 340.9 0.868289821 38.9 0.11410971 0.982399531 
1959-01-01 317.5 360.9 0.879745082 37.1 0.102798559 0.982543641 
1960-01-01 331.6 376.5 0.880743692 37.8 0.100398406 0.981142098 
1961-01-01 342.0 393.8 0.868461148 44.4 0.112747588 0.981208735 
1962-01-01 363.1 417.5 0.869700599 46.4 0.111137725 0.980838323 
1963-01-01 382.5 438.3 0.872689938 46.7 0.106548026 0.979237965 
1964-01-01 411.2 476.3 0.863321436 54.8 0.115053538 0.978374974 
1965-01-01 443.6 513.2 0.864380359 58.3 0.113600935 0.977981294 
1966-01-01 480.6 554.2 0.867195958 61.4 0.110790328 0.977986287 
1967-01-01 507.4 592.8 0.855937922 72.2 0.121794872 0.977732794 
1968-01-01 557.4 643.8 0.865796831 72.1 0.111991302 0.977788133 
1969-01-01 604.5 695.8 0.868784133 75.0 0.107789595 0.976573728 
1970-01-01 647.7 761.5 0.850558109 96.1 0.126198293 0.976756402 
1971-01-01 701.0 830.4 0.844171484 110.1 0.132586705 0.976758189 
1972-01-01 769.4 899.9 0.854983887 109.2 0.121346816 0.976330703 
1973-01-01 851.1 1006.1 0.845939767 131.8 0.131000895 0.976940662 
1974-01-01 932.0 1098.3 0.848584176 141.7 0.129017573 0.977601748 
1975-01-01 1032.8 1219.3 0.847043386 159.0 0.13040269 0.977446076 
1976-01-01 1150.2 1325.8 0.867551667 147.3 0.11110273 0.978654397 
1977-01-01 1276.7 1456.7 0.876433034 148.2 0.101736802 0.978169836 
1978-01-01 1426.2 1630.1 0.874915649 166.6 0.102202319 0.977117968 
1979-01-01 1589.5 1809.3 0.878516553 177.5 0.098104239 0.976620793 
1980-01-01 1754.6 2018.0 0.869474727 213.2 0.105649158 0.975123885 
1981-01-01 1937.5 2250.7 0.860843293 252.5 0.11218732 0.973030613 
1982-01-01 2073.9 2424.7 0.855322308 277.7 0.114529633 0.96985194 
1983-01-01 2286.5 2617.4 0.873576832 247.0 0.094368457 0.967945289 
1984-01-01 2498.2 2903.9 0.860291332 312.1 0.107476153 0.967767485 
1985-01-01 2722.7 3098.5 0.878715508 265.1 0.085557528 0.964273035 
1986-01-01 2898.4 3287.9 0.881535327 269.4 0.081936799 0.963472125 
1987-01-01 3092.1 3466.3 0.892046274 252.1 0.072728846 0.96477512 
1988-01-01 3346.9 3770.4 0.8876777 294.7 0.078161468 0.965839168 
1989-01-01 3592.8 4052.1 0.886651366 316.5 0.078107648 0.964759014 
1990-01-01 3825.6 4311.8 0.887239668 335.4 0.077786539 0.965026207 
1991-01-01 3960.2 4484.5 0.883086186 365.9 0.081592151 0.964678336 
1992-01-01 4215.7 4800.3 0.878215945 426.0 0.088744453 0.966960398 
1993-01-01 4471.0 5000.2 0.894164233 367.6 0.073517059 0.967681293 
1994-01-01 4741.0 5244.2 0.904046375 331.4 0.063193623 0.967239998 
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1995-01-01 4984.2 5532.6 0.90087843 352.9 0.063785562 0.964663992 
1996-01-01 5268.1 5829.9 0.903634711 345.2 0.059211993 0.962846704 
1997-01-01 5560.7 6148.9 0.904340614 352.2 0.057278538 0.961619151 
1998-01-01 5903.0 6561.3 0.899669273 405.3 0.061771295 0.961440568 
1999-01-01 6316.9 6876.3 0.91864811 293.0 0.042610125 0.961258235 
2000-01-01 6801.6 7400.5 0.919073036 297.9 0.040254037 0.959327072 
2001-01-01 7106.9 7752.3 0.916747288 331.2 0.042722805 0.959470093 
2002-01-01 7385.3 8099.2 0.911855492 403.9 0.049869123 0.961724615 
2003-01-01 7764.4 8486.7 0.914890358 410.8 0.048405152 0.963295509 
2004-01-01 8257.8 9003.2 0.917207215 413.2 0.045894793 0.963102008 
2005-01-01 8790.3 9401.8 0.934959263 242.7 0.025814206 0.960773469 
2006-01-01 9297.5 10037.7 0.926258007 336.9 0.033563466 0.959821473 
2007-01-01 9744.4 10507.9 0.927340382 317.2 0.030186812 0.957527194 
2008-01-01 10005.5 10995.4 0.909971443 551.3 0.050139149 0.960110592 
2009-01-01 9842.9 10937.2 0.89994697 670.7 0.061322825 0.961269795 
2010-01-01 10201.9 11243.7 0.907343668 634.2 0.05640492 0.963748588 
2011-01-01 10711.8 11787.4 0.908750021 668.2 0.05668765 0.965437671 
2012-01-01 11149.6 12245.8 0.910483594 687.4 0.056133531 0.966617126 
2013-01-01 11499.3 12474.2 0.921846692   0   
 
National Income and Debt 
Date 
Outstanding 
Debt Debt:PDI 
Real 
GDP 
Consumption 
as a 
Percentage of 
GDP Debt:GDP 
1947-01-01 44.16 0.033635463 1937.6 0.083608588 2.279108175 
1948-01-01 52.7 0.038127623 2018.0 0.086719524 2.611496531 
1949-01-01 60.53 0.043443623 2007.0 0.088938714 3.015944195 
1950-01-01 73.3 0.04816348 2181.9 0.088088363 3.359457354 
1951-01-01 81.86 0.052030763 2357.7 0.088433643 3.472027824 
1952-01-01 94.02 0.057758938 2453.7 0.089456739 3.831764274 
1953-01-01 106.22 0.062229773 2568.9 0.0907003 4.134843707 
1954-01-01 117.69 0.067973894 2554.4 0.09391638 4.60734419 
1955-01-01 138.35 0.074925535 2736.4 0.094540272 5.055912878 
1956-01-01 153.2 0.079181311 2794.7 0.097183955 5.481804845 
1957-01-01 165.79 0.083525618 2853.5 0.100473103 5.810057824 
1958-01-01 176.55 0.088015355 2832.6 0.104497635 6.232789663 
1959-01-01 198.54 0.094899861 3028.1 0.104851227 6.556586638 
1960-01-01 216.49 0.100838418 3105.8 0.106767982 6.970506794 
1961-01-01 233.87 0.105218878 3185.1 0.107374965 7.342626605 
1962-01-01 255.81 0.109832124 3379.9 0.107429214 7.568567117 
1963-01-01 282.91 0.117074281 3527.1 0.108446032 8.021037113 
1964-01-01 312.66 0.120806769 3730.5 0.110226511 8.381182147 
1965-01-01 340.57 0.123893194 3972.9 0.111656473 8.572327519 
1966-01-01 363.1 0.125423143 4234.9 0.11348556 8.573992302 
1967-01-01 386.81 0.12805734 4351.2 0.116611509 8.889731568 
1968-01-01 415.2 0.131500602 4564.7 0.122132889 9.09588801 
1969-01-01 444.96 0.136306825 4707.9 0.128401198 9.451347735 
1970-01-01 460.26 0.134839163 4717.7 0.137291477 9.756025182 
1971-01-01 503.25 0.140950594 4873.0 0.143853889 10.32731377 
1972-01-01 558.23 0.149207495 5128.8 0.150015598 10.88422243 
1973-01-01 628.21 0.158295117 5418.2 0.157100144 11.59444096 
1974-01-01 684.53 0.174460331 5390.2 0.172906386 12.69952877 
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1975-01-01 741.52 0.184448535 5379.5 0.191988103 13.78418069 
1976-01-01 828.54 0.199937259 5669.3 0.20288219 14.61450267 
1977-01-01 956.13 0.223666604 5930.6 0.215273328 16.12197754 
1978-01-01 1111.21 0.248565037 6260.4 0.227812919 17.74982429 
1979-01-01 1278.54 0.280516916 6459.2 0.246083106 19.79409215 
1980-01-01 1395.96 0.304090969 6443.4 0.27230965 21.66495949 
1981-01-01 1505.94 0.320024651 6610.6 0.293089886 22.78068557 
1982-01-01 1575.79 0.328057209 6484.3 0.319834061 24.30162084 
1983-01-01 1731.09 0.348237779 6784.7 0.337008269 25.51461376 
1984-01-01 1943.12 0.365660519 7277.2 0.343291376 26.70147859 
1985-01-01 2277.66 0.415912203 7585.7 0.358925346 30.02570626 
1986-01-01 2534.22 0.445545808 7852.1 0.369124183 32.2744234 
1987-01-01 2752.52 0.473665915 8123.9 0.380617684 33.8817563 
1988-01-01 3039.85 0.499654827 8465.4 0.395362298 35.90911239 
1989-01-01 3309.16 0.527877744 8777.0 0.4093426 37.70263188 
1990-01-01 3571.56 0.558614865 8945.4 0.427661144 39.92621906 
1991-01-01 3758.49 0.583752427 8938.9 0.443029903 42.04644867 
1992-01-01 3961.66 0.590033213 9256.7 0.455421478 42.7977573 
1993-01-01 4203.46 0.616017938 9510.8 0.470097153 44.1967027 
1994-01-01 4527.04 0.645723741 9894.7 0.479145401 45.75217035 
1995-01-01 4846.07 0.668801667 10163.7 0.490392278 47.68017553 
1996-01-01 5183.84 0.693378989 10549.5 0.499369638 49.138253 
1997-01-01 5489.37 0.708177878 11022.9 0.504467971 49.79968974 
1998-01-01 5902.88 0.719135509 11513.4 0.512706933 51.26965102 
1999-01-01 6377.63 0.752274175 12071.4 0.52329473 52.83256292 
2000-01-01 6962.89 0.782127492 12565.2 0.541312514 55.41408016 
2001-01-01 7628.5 0.833779633 12684.4 0.560286651 60.14080288 
2002-01-01 8440.92 0.89495213 12909.7 0.572073712 65.38432342 
2003-01-01 9463.53 0.976527706 13270.0 0.585109269 71.31522231 
2004-01-01 10535.33 1.049680672 13774.0 0.599520836 76.4870771 
2005-01-01 11719.49 1.150040724 14235.6 0.61749417 82.3252269 
2006-01-01 12941.04 1.2212676 14615.2 0.636152772 88.54507636 
2007-01-01 13807.13 1.275862611 14876.8 0.655013175 92.80981125 
2008-01-01 13805.81 1.256398566 14833.6 0.674515964 93.07120321 
2009-01-01 13533.87 1.237416341 14417.9 0.682693041 93.86852454 
2010-01-01 13196.8 1.193114422 14779.4 0.69027836 89.29185217 
2011-01-01 13016.98 1.149442806 15052.4 0.711634025 86.47777099 
2012-01-01 12979.7 1.123627896 15470.7 0.720691371 83.89859541 
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Appendix	  2:	  Diagram	  of	  neo-­‐Kaleckian	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Appendix	  3:	  Derivation	  of	  consumption	  model 
 
€ 
C = CW +CR +D
•
C = CW +CR + β(CT −CW )
C = CW +CR + βηCR − βCW
C = (1− β)CW + (1+ βη)CR  
If we assume that production workers’ wages are a fraction of supervisory workers’ wages, 
namely: 
€ 
WR = φWP
 Then it is clear that: 
€ 
C = (1− β)cW (WPϕN − iDR ) + (1+ βη)cπ (φWP (1−ϕ)N +Π+ iDR )
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Appendix	  4:	  Derivation	  of	  growth	  model	  with	  previous	  consumption	  
model
 If we impose a temporary equilbrium condtion with the absence of the public sector, we can see 
that Y = C + I so: 
 
€ 
Y = (1− β)cW (WPϕN − iDR ) + (1+ βη)cπ (φWPϕN +Π+ iDR ) + I
 In addition, it is useful to note that: 
 
€ 
WPϕN =
WPϕN
Y *Y =ωPY
and
Π
Y *Y = πY  
Where ωP is the production workers’ share of income, and π is the profit share of income. Once 
we do this, if we divide both sides by K to obtain a formula for the utilization rate of capacity, 
we get: 
 
€ 
u = (1− β)cWωPu − (1− β)cWidR + (1+ βη)cπφωPu + (1+ βη)cππu + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0 + γ1πu
u − (1− β)cWωPu − (1+ βη)cπφωPu − (1+ βη)cππu − γ1πu = (1− β)cWidR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0
u(1− (1− β)cWωP − (1+ βη)cπφωP − (1+ βη)cππ − γ1π ) = (1− β)cWidR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0
u = (1− β)cWidR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0(1− (1− β)cWωP − (1+ βη)cπφωP − (1+ βη)cππ − γ1π )  
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Appendix 5: Calculation of dRmax 
We start with the relationship the assumption that the most a consumer can use to service their 
debts is 100% of their given income, namely: 
€ 
iDRmax −WPN = 0
 Dividing through by k we get  
€ 
dRmax =
ωPu
i
 
If we plug-in for u, we get a relationship that requires a u that is dependent on the maximum 
value of dR, so we can solve for dR: 
€ 
dRmax =
(1−π)(−cWdRmax i(1− β) + γ 0 + cπdRmax i(1+ βη))
i(1+ φ)(1− (1− β)cWωP − (1+ βη)cπφωP − (1+ βη)cππ − γ1π)
dRmax (1+ φ)(1− (1− β)cWωP − (1+ βη)cπφωP − (1+ βη)cππ − γ1π) + (1−π)(cW (1− β) − cπ (1+ βη)
=
γ 0(1+ φ)(1− (1− β)cWωP − (1+ βη)cπφωP − (1+ βη)cππ − γ1π)
i
dRmax =
γ 0(1+ φ)(1− (1− β)cWωP − (1+ βη)cπφωP − (1+ βη)cππ − γ1π)
i(1+ φ)(1− (1− β)cWωP − (1+ βη)cπφωP − (1+ βη)cππ − γ1π) + (1−π)(cW (1− β) − cπ (1+ βη)  
 
